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I. INTRODUCTION
Fourteen-year-old girls, accompanied by their mothers, compete in
weekly song and dance performances to win the ultimate birthday party and
a talent contract with a television network. Four well-known judges try to
shore up their waning fame as former celebrities by ripping apart the
performances with theatrical and sometimes stinging criticisms.
Twenty-six models, identically-dressed and each bearing a metal
suitcase, saunter onto a brightly-lit stage. Contestants guess the amounts in
the suitcases; they agonize over taking the risk of guessing for more money
or accepting settlement offers from a mysterious banker in an elevated and
darkened glass chamber.
These are just two of the latest reality television shows captivating
American audiences, with one possibly unexpected twist: they are both
broadcast in Spanish. Quinceahera mirrors other successful reality shows,
notably American Idol, except that the show's prize is based on the Latin-
American/Hispanic tradition of celebrating a girl's entrance into
womanhood at the age of fifteen, and the girls and judges are all Latin-
American/Hispanic.' Vas o No Vas is identical in every respect to the new
hit American show, Deal or No Deal, except that the multicultural yet
identical models, contestants, host, and audience are all Latin-
American/Hispanic.2
Popular American television programming is fast being transposed to
appeal to Latin-American/Hispanic viewers as the Spanish-speaking
populations in the United States and Latin America become critical markets
for broadcasting networks. As of June 2005, the United States Census
Bureau estimated that 41.3 million Latin-Americans/Hispanics resided in
the country.3 Mexico, an ever-growing market for telecommunications,
boasts approximately seventy million residents from the ages of fifteen to
1. See Telemundo Eventos, Quinceafiera, http://www.telemundoeventos.com/
quinceaneralelshow.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
2. See Telemundo Eventos, Vas o No Vas, http://www.telemundoeventos.comvonv/
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
3. Hispanic Population in US. Soars, CBS NEWS, June 9, 2005, http://www.cbsnews
.com/stories/2005/06/09/national/main700582.shtml.
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sixty-four.4 Both American and Mexican broadcasting companies are eager
to capitalize on each country's burgeoning Spanish language markets.
With the changing racial and linguistic composition of the American
market and the emerging strength of the Mexican market, American
broadcast companies are facing a new competitive playing field. Mexican
and other Latin-American broadcasting companies are guarding their own
regional markets while aggressively pursuing growing Spanish-speaking
American audiences; increasingly, regulated competition between the two
countries has elevated to a no-holds-barred battle with uncertain legal
boundaries. But the struggle over Spanish-speaking audiences is just one
part of the global competition between the United States and other
countries. The television broadcast community is truly international, and
new competition over Spanish-language audiences merely exemplifies the
broader efforts that broadcast companies are undertaking to target any
nation with a substantial television-owning population.
This global competition is not without rules, at least within the United
States. Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934 ("Act") establishes
the guidelines for when a foreign national is eligible to apply for a
broadcast license from the Federal Communications Commission's
("FCC"). This provision sets forth limits on the percentage ownership that
a foreign government or foreign agent may hold in an American broadcast
license. The FCC currently interprets these limits on foreign ownership
very leniently, favoring a policy of deregulation in an attempt to further
open up the United States market. This interpretation of § 310, in turn, has
influenced the FCC's formulation of criteria for granting and renewing
broadcast licenses to foreign nationals under §§ 301 and 307 of the Act.
This Note argues that once foreign nationals have cleared the hurdle of §
310's foreign ownership requirements, the licensing standards under §§
301 and 307 are weakened and even ignored, allowing foreign applicants to
engage in anticompetitive behavior in order to obtain broadcast licenses
over domestic applicants.
This argument is illustrated through two notable broadcasting disputes
that will be the subject of later sections of this Note. In 1994, the National
Broadcasting Company ("NBC"), Columbia Broadcasting System
("CBS"), and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People ("NAACP") filed a complaint and petition with the FCC alleging
that Fox Broadcasting Company ("Fox") was violating the foreign
ownership rules through its connection with the Australia-based News
4. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Mexico CIA - The World
Factbook - Mexico, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
mx.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
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Corporation. 5 By violating the foreign ownership rules, NBC alleged, Fox
was able to obtain numerous television broadcast licenses illegally and thus
obtain an unfair advantage over NBC and other domestic broadcast
companies. NBC asked that the FCC deny renewal of a number of Fox's
broadcast licenses. The FCC declined to do so.
6
More recently, Mexican broadcast companies TV Azteca and Televisa
have thwarted NBC's attempts to break into the Mexican market; at the
same time, the FCC has freely granted TV Azteca and Televisa license
renewals to operate in the United States.' After documented reports of
violent and aggressive behavior on the part of these Mexican broadcasters
against NBC's Mexican affiliate, NBC filed a petition with the FCC asking
the agency to deny renewal of TV Azteca's Los Angeles broadcast license;
the FCC rejected NBC's petition and renewed TV Azteca's license. TV
Azteca and Fox are two examples of how the free-market, deregulatory
policy behind § 310 has not had the desired result of opening up
international competition and has instead promoted anticompetitive
behavior leading to obstruction of the licensing requirements under §§ 301
and 307.
This Note first lays out the history of the FCC's regulation of foreign
broadcast license holders and discusses the current regulation of foreign
broadcast licensees under § 310. The current interpretation of § 310 affects
license renewals under §§ 301 and 307, which are the topic of the second
section of this Note. Furthermore, this Note, through case studies of Fox
and TV Azteca, explores the problems that have arisen as a result of these
interpretations of §§ 301, 307, and 310. Finally, this Note argues that the
FCC must incorporate some requirement of reciprocity under § 310 if the
agency indeed hopes to foster fair and legitimate international competition
free of any anticompetitive behavior.
5. Erik Larson, Will Murdoch Be Outfoxed?, TIME, Apr. 17, 1995, at 45, 45-47,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,982814-3,00.html.
6. Id.
7. HispanicTips, Azteca America Reports FCC Denies NBC's Objections Against
Azteca America and Its License Renewal of Its Affiliate Station in L.A., available at
http://www.hispanictips.com/2007/04/17/azteca-america-reports-denies-nbcs-objections-
against-azteca-america-license-renewal-affiliate-station-la/.
8. Id.
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II. REGULATING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF BROADCAST
LICENSES
A. Background. The National Security Concern
The policy behind foreign ownership restrictions has undergone
various transformations since the very first restriction appeared in 1912.
This early restriction was based on national security concerns. After the
United States Navy had conducted a study of the Japanese Army's use of
wireless communications in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, President
Theodore Roosevelt requested that the navy bring the fledgling
communications industry under government control.9 The navy had
succeeded in persuading "Congress of the potential military importance of
radio, and foreign ownership restrictions were written into the Radio Act of
1912 to prevent foreign agents from transmitting radio messages, especially
during wartime."'
Congress revisited the Radio Act of 1912 through the Radio Act of
1927, further restricting levels of foreign ownership by prohibiting foreign
nationals from holding office in licensee companies and limiting foreign
ownership of stock in licensee companies to twenty percent." In the
Communications Act of 1934, Congress created the foreign ownership
restrictions that are still in effect today.'
2
Motivated by lingering World War I national security concerns,
Congress used § 310 of the Act to close up any loopholes left over from the
previous two Radio Acts and to prevent foreign domination, both direct and
indirect, of American broadcast licenses. 13 Section 310 lays out the
qualifications that foreign applicants must fulfill in order to apply for
broadcast, radio, or common carrier licenses.' 4 Ownership restrictions are
specifically laid out in § 310 (b):
(b) Grant to or holding by alien or representative, foreign corporation,
etc.
9. Donna M. DiPaolo, Foreign Ownership in Communications: Are the Restrictions
Outdated?, NAT'L DEFENSE UNIV. INST. FOR NAT'L STRATEGIC STUDIES, Oct. 1, 2002,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%202000/essa/essafoca.html (citing J. GREGORY
SIDAK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1997)).
10. Id.
11. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
12. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C).
13. See J. GREGORY SIDAK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
64 (1997).
14. This Note will focus primarily on the Act's application to television broadcast
licensing.
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No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en route or
aeronautical fixed radio station license shall be granted to or held by-
(1) any alien or the representative of any alien;
(2) any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign
government;
(3) any corporation of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is
owned of record or voted by aliens or their representatives or by a
foreign government or representative thereof or by any corporation
organized under the laws of a foreign country;
(4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other
corporation of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is
owned of record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a
foreign government or representative thereof, or by any corporation
organized under the laws of a foreign country, if the Commission finds
that the public interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of
such license. 5
National security, public interest, and competition were the three
concerns under which the FCC evaluated § 310 (b), although the national
security concern trumped the other two in importance for some time.
1 6
Until the mid-1990's, the FCC and federal courts took the national security
concern very seriously and allowed very few partly foreign-owned
companies to apply for broadcast licenses. 17 In many cases, the FCC cited
national security as the main reason for denial of a license, giving a
rundown of the very same legislative history described above.' 8
The national security concern's domination of the FCC's and the
courts' interpretations of § 310 led many critics to categorize the provision
as anachronistic; one critic even referred to the provision as a "sacred cow"
that legislators have feared to touch.19 Indeed, on its face, § 310(b) did
seem to restrict foreign ownership to a degree that may seem unreasonable
in light of the globalized economy and increase in free trade. This view
resounded with corporations and trade groups who had been seeking
legislative reform for years. As the Motion Picture Association of America
explained in 1995:
Historically, the U.S. Government had been concerned that foreign
control of mass media facilities would confer control over the content
of widely available broadcast material, which could lead to the
possibility of foreign propaganda and misinformation. These fears
15 Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
16. See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (a)-(e) (1999).
17. See, e.g.,Moving Phones P'shp. v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
18. See Seven Hills Television Co., License Renewal, 2 F.C.C.R. 6867, 6893 nn. 25-29
(1987). See also Data Transmission Co., Declaratory Ruling, 52 F.C.C.2d 439,440 (1975).
19. DiPaolo, supra note 9. See also Ian M. Rose, Barring Foreigners from our
Airwaves: An Anachronistic Pothole on the Global Information Highway, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1188 (1995).
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were not unreasonable during a period when there were relatively few
sources of information available to the public. MPAA does not believe
that foreign ownership provides the same sort of risk in today's
environment, where sources of information have multiplied
tremendously.20
B. Fall of the National Security Concern and Rise of the Public
Interest Concern
Interpretation of § 310 changed course in the mid-1990's. Much of
this change was prompted by the new Telecommunications Act of 1996.21
Although this piece of legislation did not affect the foreign ownership
restrictions contained in the 1934 Act, it was still "the first major overhaul
of telecommunications law in almost 62 years. The goal of this new law
[was] to let anyone enter any communications business -- to let any
communications business compete in any market against any other.
22
Building on this free-trade sentiment, the FCC's interpretation of foreign
ownership restrictions began to focus more on a public interest concern
centered on economic gains and less on an anachronistic national security
concern.
23
In order to clear up confusion surrounding these changes, the FCC's
International Bureau laid out the new, competition-friendly application of §
310 (b) in the Foreign Ownership Guidelines for FCC Common Carrier and
Aeronautical Radio Licenses.24 These guidelines clarified the various
provisions of § 310(b), specifically the last provision. While all of § 310
concerns foreign ownership restrictions, most foreign companies choose to
pursue § 31 0(b)(4) rather than (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3) because it provides
the most flexibility and potential for actually obtaining a broadcast license.
Section 310(b)(4) "establishes a 25 percent benchmark for investment by
foreign individuals, corporations, and governments in entities that control a
U.S." broadcast license.25 The FCC has the discretion "to allow higher
levels of foreign ownership unless it finds that such ownership is
inconsistent with the public interest. 26 This concern with the "public
interest" supplanted the national security concern.
20. DiPaolo, supra note 9.
21. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
22. Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC Web site, available at http://www.fcc.gov
/telecom.html.
23. See Mkt. Entry and Reg. of Foreign-affiliated Entities, Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 3873, para. 183 (1995) [hereinafter Market Entry Report].
24. Foreign Ownership Guidelines for FCC Common Carrier and Aeronautical Radio
Licenses, available at: http://www.fcc.gov/ib/ForeignOwnershipGuidelinesErratum.pdf
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id.
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In Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affiliated Entities, the
FCC made it clear that they would indeed exercise discretion and embrace
a policy of allowing higher levels of foreign ownership. 27 The limits set
forth in § 310 (b) could be relaxed in order to promote competition in the
international market.28 Thus, the limits were easily stretched because the
concern of "public interest" had become consonant with a desire for
increased foreign investment in the American broadcast industry.
In addition to putting forth a general policy of encouraging foreign
applications and international competition, the FCC issued a Foreign
Participation Order upon the creation of the World Trade Organization's
("WTO") Basic Telecommunications Agreement. In the Foreign
Participation Order, the FCC declared that WTO member countries would
enjoy certain benefits and presumptive validity when applying for
broadcast licenses.29 A notable foreign licensing case, 30 Applications of
Voicestream Wireless Corporation, Powertel, Inc., Transferors, and
Deutsche Telekom AG, Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of
Licenses and Authorizations Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the
Communications Act and Petition for Declaratory Ruling Pursuant to
Section 310 of the Communications Act ("Deutsche Telekom"), heralded
this development.3 '
In Deutsche Telekom, the FCC announced that the public interest
standard-in cases involving foreign entities holding licenses-should be
decided in light of the Foreign Participation Order, a document setting forth
the FCC's commitment to international cooperation.32 The Foreign
Participation Order recognized that the United States, as a member of the
WTO, was committed to fostering competition with other members. It
reiterated that standards restricting foreign ownership of licenses would be
relaxed in the spirit of encouraging international competition; it introduced
a rebuttable presumption that anticompetitive concerns were not raised by
indirect ownership of United States licenses by WTO member countries
27. See Market Entry Report, supra note 23.
28. See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomm. Mkt. & Mkt.
Entry and Reg. of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, Report and Order and Order on
Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 23891, para. 29 (1997) [hereinafter Foreign Participation
Order].
29. See id.
30. Although this case involves wireless communication, the FCC's interpretation of §
310 is applicable to all mediums of communication, including television.
31. Applications of Voicestream Wireless Corporation, Powertel, Inc., Transferors, and
Deutsche Telekom AG, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9779,
2001 WL 476559 (F.C.C.) (2001).
32. Seeid. atpara. 18.
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under § 310(b)(4).33 Previously, the main hurdle under § 310(b)(4) had
been that indirect foreign ownership exploited the potential for secrecy and
resultant anticompetitive behavior. Under the Foreign Participation Order,
the FCC effectively waived § 31 0(b)(4) restrictions for any applicant who
hails from a WTO member country. This rebuttable presumption was a
critical blow to the national security concern, putting foreign broadcast
license applicants on virtually the same or better footing as domestic
applicants.34
The FCC took the mandate of the WTO Basic Telecommunications
Agreement seriously and loosened the foreign ownership restrictions
(through interpretation rather than through a change in statutory language)
in an effort to gain the same reciprocity for Americans seeking licenses in
other countries.35 The FCC and members of Congress applauded the about-
face in FCC interpretation as a step toward open competition.36
Based on the considerable cushion afforded to foreign nationals
through the waiver of § 31 0(b)'s public interest requirement, nationals of
Mexico and other WTO member countries are no longer reined in by §
310(b) when applying for broadcast licenses in the United States.
Effectively, once foreign applicants qualify under the permissive
restrictions set forth in § 310 (b), they are then limited only by the
regulations that govern renewals of licenses for domestic applicants under
§§ 301 and 307 of the Act.
III. LICENSE GRANT AND RENEWAL UNDER § 301 OF THE ACT
Section 301 requires anyone who wants to broadcast in the United
States to obtain a license from the FCC:
It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain the
control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission;
and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership
thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted
by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create
any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license. No
person shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of
energy or communications or signals by radio.., except under and in
accordance with this chapter and with a license in that behalf granted
under the provisions of this chapter.
37
33. See id.
34. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 28.
35. See id.
36. See Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Commerce, Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of
William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/ Kennard/
Statements/2000/stwek071 .html.
37. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
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The FCC has licensed and continues to renew the licenses of
approximately 4,000 television broadcasting stations throughout the
country.38 Under current FCC policy, licenses are valid for eight years;3 9
thereupon, the broadcaster must apply for a renewal of the license. The
licensing and renewal requirements allow the FCC to control not only who
operates broadcast stations but also what is broadcast in the first place.
Unfortunately, the Act overall is a vague text. Although § 301 clearly
states that anyone who wishes to broadcast must hold a license, it is not as
clear regarding the standards for determining who may receive and renew a
license. The governing standard is for the FCC to act "as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires." 40 As in the § 310(b) analysis,
the question of public interest is presented, but the basis for public interest
takes on different contours under the licensing renewal requirements of §
301.
A. General Requirements
Under the general licensing procedures of § 301 of the Act, a
domestic applicant must first show that the broadcast station is technically
operable in a table of spectrum allotments. This requirement ensures that
the use is technically feasible and will not interfere with the operation of
other services.4 ' In the case of those seeking licenses for television stations,
this requirement is not problematic because the FCC has already allocated
portions of the spectrum for television stations.
After clearing the first hurdle of service, the applicant may face
another problem depending on whether the application is opposed or
uncontested. If the application is uncontested, the license will most likely
be granted. The only requirements that must be satisfied are: (1) the
applicant must be a United States citizen, or the station must be principally
owned by a United States citizen; (2) the applicant must pass a character
qualification assessment showing that he has not violated FCC rules or
antitrust laws; (3) the applicant must have sufficient financial stability to
support the station; and (4) the applicant must give advanced notification of
proposed programming.42 The first requirement, of course, is satisfied if the
foreign applicant has already gotten past § 31 0(b)'s foreign ownership
38. Federal Communications Commission, Broadcast Station Totals as of September
30, 2006 (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://tjalifoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-268509Al.pdf.
39. See THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 23 (2d
ed. 1998).
40. See id.
41. Id. at 93.
42. Id. at 93.
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requirements. As long as the other three requirements are also satisfied, the
FCC will grant the license.
However, if the application is opposed, as has begun to happen with
foreign applicants who have perhaps unfairly cleared § 310(b)'s hurdles,
the field of requirements changes considerably. The opposition may come
in two different forms: first, it may be opposed by a rival applicant who
seeks a license to operate the same station;43 second, it simply may be
opposed by the filing of a petition to deny the license. 4 The FCC is
confronted with the task of determining what the public interest dictates in
situations involving contested applications for licenses or renewals. 45 This
public interest question is independent from the public interest inquiry
under § 31 0(b)(4).
In the case of opposition in the form of two applicants seeking a
license for the same station, one of the earliest notable cases is Ashbacker
Radio Corp. v. FCC.46 In Ashbacker, the Supreme Court re-emphasized the
"public interest" standard in granting licenses but additionally determined
that in the case of opposing applications, the FCC must hold a comparative
hearing. "[W]here two bona fide applications are mutually exclusive the
grant of one without a hearing to both deprives the loser of the opportunity
which Congress chose to give him.",47 The Supreme Court initially required
a comparative hearing pursuant to this decision but declined to specify the
criteria for determining which applicant would better serve the public
interest.
In Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals clearly summarized the basic guidelines for determining which
applicant should receive the FCC license:
When the minimum qualifications of both applicants have been
established, the public interest will be protected no matter which
applicant is chosen. From there on the public interest is served by the
selection of the better qualified applicant, and the private interest of
each applicant comes into play upon that question. Thus, the
comparative hearing is an adversary proceeding.
48
It is clear that the question of what public policy requires is a very fact-
specific one; the FCC is afforded a great amount of discretion in
formulating the public policy from circumstance to circumstance. Today,
comparative hearings have been abolished in the case of renewal
43. Id. at 97.
44. Id. at 93.
45. Id. at 123.
46. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
47. Id. at 333.
48. Johnston Broad. Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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applications; the FCC guarantees that licensees are afforded some measure
of renewal expectancy.49
Currently, two factors are truly determinative in denying an
applicant's petition for license renewal: diversity and characterf ° In the
1965 Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, the FCC laid out the
substantial factors to be considered in awarding licenses: diversification of
control of the media of communication,5 owners' full-time participation in
operation of the station, past experience in broadcast station operation, and
strength of character.52 This last factor, character, has subsequently been
modified by the FCC's issuance of Character Qualifications in
Broadcasting Licensing.53 The FCC is now concerned with fraudulent
representations to government units, criminal misconduct involving false
statements or dishonesty, and broadcast-related violations of antitrust or
other laws dealing with competition.54
Today, character has become the central factor in most of the FCC's
refusals to renew licenses. In a 1980 study of license renewals, researchers
found that the most-stated reason for revocation of license was proof of
misrepresentations made to the FCC.5 This factor becomes even more
important in light of the fact that applicants who are seeking renewal of a
license have already demonstrated the capital and commitment to run a
station. Thus, opponents to an applicant's petition for renewal are left with
virtually one route of attack: character-to the extent that the applicant has
misrepresented himself in some way to the FCC.
49. See Citizens Commc'ns Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Citizens
Communications Center, the court ruled that any challenges to a renewal application would
not be sustained unless there were "serious deficiencies" in the incumbent's past
performance. Id. at 1210.
50. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Public Notice, I
F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
51. Diversification questionably refers not only to common versus individual control of
broadcast stations, but also racial minority ownership of stations. See Metro Brdcst., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 547 (1990). The uncertainty stems from a subsequent case that may or
may not have ruled the FCC's diversification program unconstitutional. See Adarand
Constr. Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995). Additionally, the FCC seems to have moved
in a direction that would place diversity of output over diversity of ownership. See Jeng Fen
Mao, The Racial Implications of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: The Congressional
Mandate of Neighborhood Purity, 41 How. L.J. 501,503 (1998).
52. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, supra note 50, at paras. 1-2,
6.
53. Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, Policy Statement
and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 3252, paras. 1-2 (1990).
54. See id. at para. 3.
55. See Frederic A. Weiss et al., Station License Revocations and Denials of Review,
1970-1978, 24 J. OF BROADCASTING 69,76 (1980).
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Therefore, the standard for denying a broadcast license or application
for a renewal of a broadcast license is a high one: fraud or
misrepresentation directed toward the FCC on the part of the applicant. As
outlined in Part II of this Note, under § 310(b), foreign applicants enjoy a
rebuttable presumption of operating favorably for the public interest; in
reviewing denials of licenses under § 301, it is clear that the only attacks
that can overcome this rebuttable presumption would be attacks that evince
fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the foreign applicant.
Unfortunately, even these attacks have proved unsatisfactory in persuading
the FCC that certain license renewal applications must be denied.
Foreign applicants who pass the lax test of § 310(b) operate a license
for a number of years and then apply for a renewal of that license; their
renewal application is then evaluated under § 301. The rationales of
international competition and free market enterprise behind § 310 have
transposed themselves onto the basic licensing requirements of § 301. The
FCC has begun to incorporate the policy of promoting foreign trade in their
§ 301 license renewal evaluation, impermissibly giving foreign applicants
an extra "bonus" over their domestic counterparts seeking broadcast
licenses within the United States.56 This bonus allows foreign owners to
enjoy advantages in station ownership while United States companies grow
frustrated by attempts to obtain broadcast licenses in other countries like
Mexico and minority American voices are shut out of their own broadcast
market.
57
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM CURRENT
INTERPRETATION OF §§ 310 AND 301
A. Australian Ownership of Fox Broadcasting Company
One of the earliest examples of discontent under the permissible
interpretation of § 310 is illustrated by an FCC complaint filed by the
NAACP and NBC Universal. The NAACP filed the original complaint,
alleging that Fox had misrepresented its level of foreign ownership when it
applied for licenses in 1985.58 Because of the foreign capital available
through the News Corporation owned by Australian Rupert Murdoch, Fox
56. See Bill Carter, The Media Business; NBC is Challenging Fox TV Operations As
Foreign-Owned, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994, at Al, available at http://select.nytimes.com/
gst/abstract.htm?res=F5OA 12FB3B540C738FDDA80994DC494D81 &n=Top%2fReferenc
e%2fTimes%20Topics%2fOrganizations%2fF%2fFedera%2OCommunications%2OComnii
ssion%20.
57. See id.
58. See Edmund L. Andrews, Issues of Foreign Ownership Cloud the Future of Fox TV,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1994, at Al.
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
was able to dominate ownership of television stations and impermissibly
deny ownership opportunities to American minorities. 59 The NAACP and
NBC challenged Fox's ownership structure and asked that the FCC deny
Fox's upcoming applications for renewal of broadcasting licenses in certain
cities.60 In the face of these complaints, the FCC asked Fox to disclose its
complete company equity structure to see if any misrepresentation had
occurred in Fox's original 1985 application for American licenses. In 1985,
Fox had told the FCC that "the stations would be held by a company called
the Twentieth Holdings Corporation, with 76 percent of the voting rights
controlled by Mr. Murdoch and Barry Diller, then the chief Fox executive
and an American citizen, and 24 percent held by the [Australian] News
Corporation."6' Additionally, Mr. Murdoch renounced Australian
citizenship and became an American citizen. With this arrangement, Fox
was well within the twenty-five percent benchmark set out in § 310(b)(4)
for foreign ownership.
Fox had indeed misrepresented itself back in 1985. "Fox disclosed
that Mr. Murdoch's financial stake in the company was less than 1 percent,
with the [Australian] News Corporation owning more than 99 percent of
the equity., 62 However, the FCC accepted Fox's argument that §
31 0(b)(4)'s twenty-five percent limit be enforced only as to voting interest
rather than equity interest. 63 Thus, even though the News Corporation, an
Australian company, held virtually all of the equity shares of Fox, Mr.
Murdoch, now an American, still retained seventy-six percent of the voting
interest of Fox. The FCC's acceptance of Fox's tenuous argument was
most likely, at least in part, a reflection of the procompetition and open
market attitude that drove relaxation of § 310(b) limitations. A supporter of
relaxed § 310(b) limitations, among many, saw Fox's violation of foreign
ownership guidelines and the FCC's refusal to deny Fox licenses based on
that misrepresentation as cause for celebration: "It is a last-ditch attempt to
destroy... Fox's nearly 9-year-long effort to end the hegemony of ABC,
CBS, and NBC and emerge as a viable national network competitor.'
€4
However, it seems antithetical in every sense to promote competition
59. See Larson, supra note 5.
60. See Carter, supra note 56.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Press Release, FCC Mass Media Bureau, FCC Allows Fox to Retain Ownership
Structure; Renewal of WNYW-TV, New York City, Granted (Jul. 28, 1995), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/NewsReleases/nrmm5086.txt [hereinafter FCC
Mass Media Bureau].
64. Ian M. Rose, Barring Foreigners from Our Airwaves: An Anachronistic Pothole on
the Global Information Highway, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1188, 1227 (1995).
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through allowing misrepresentation and fabrication of information required
by § 310 (b).
Nor is there any argument for allowing greater Australian ownership
of American broadcast licenses in order to promote international
cooperation and trade reciprocity; Australia only allows foreign companies
fifteen percent ownership of Australian television stations.65 The FCC is
going beyond just providing an Australian corporation a broadcast license
through flexible § 310(b) regulations; the FCC is turning a blind eye to
misrepresentation on the part of this partly-Australian corporation.
Australia, at least until recently, has certainly not been as obliging to
American broadcast companies seeking licenses.
The FCC ultimately ruled that Fox made no misrepresentations in its
1985 foreign ownership disclosures and renewed Fox's licenses for
broadcasting in Wisconsin and other areas.66 Not only does it seem that the
FCC allowed Fox to operate as a foreign-dominated corporation above the
levels allowed in § 310(b), it also seems that the FCC pushed a policy of
encouraging international cooperation and competition, thus turning a blind
eye to misrepresentations that should have affected Fox's renewal
application under § 301.
Even if Fox's growing presence as a major network has proved
beneficial in providing a better variety of programming for Americans, the
growth has come at a cost: broadcast networks are sent a signal that the
FCC may be willing to overlook possible misrepresentations or omissions
of crucial foreign ownership information in order to foster the spirit of
competition and the free market enterprise. Additionally, Fox subsequently
engaged in questionably anticompetitive tactics involving syndication of
television shows.67 The price of this signal may very well overwhelm any
possibility of fair competition.
B. Spanish Language Broadcasting: Drama in More than Just the
Programming
The main example of the failure of current § 310(b) interpretation in
encouraging fair and open competition is embodied by the dispute between
NBC Universal's Telemundo and Mexican broadcaster TV Azteca. Before
discussing the dispute at hand, a brief overview of the corporate makeups
of Telemundo, TV Azteca, and two other Spanish-language broadcast
65. See Carter, supra note 55.
66. See FCC Mass Media Bureau, supra note 62.
67. See Carter, supra note 55 ("[T]he [FCC] exempted Fox from rules that kept the
other networks out of the lucrative business of syndicating the programs they showed -- that
is, selling reruns of those shows to local stations.").
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networks, Univision and Televisa, is necessary to show the complicated
ownership structures that underlie and entangle each company.
1. Univision and Telemundo
Univision and Telemundo are the first- and second-largest Spanish-
language broadcast networks in the United States. Univision, the older of
the two networks, began in 1955 with a Spanish-language station in San
Antonio, Texas. After years of expansion, the company was purchased in
1992 by A. Jerrold Perenchio.68 To complicate the Univision ownership
structure, ten percent is owned by a Mexican broadcasting powerhouse,
Televisa, even though Televisa has challenged Univision over payments for
popular Spanish-language programming.69
Telemundo originated in 1985 as the first full-time independent
Spanish-language station in Los Angeles and then acquired stations in Fort
Lauderdale/Miami, Puerto Rico, and New York; today, the network has
stations all over the United States. Much of the early Telemundo staff was
made up of former Univision employees. In 2001, NBC Universal-eighty
percent owned by General Electric, a United States company, and twenty
percent owned by Vivendi, a French company 7 -- purchased Telemundo,
also hiring a Mexican partner, Isaac Saba Raffoul. Thus, Mexican citizens
own small shares in both Univision and Telemundo, the leading Spanish-
language broadcast networks in the United States.
2. Televisa, TV Azteca, and Mexican Communications
Regulations
Televisa and TV Azteca are the first- and second-largest broadcast
networks in Mexico. 7' Televisa was the owner of the first television station
in Latin America.7 2 In 1997, Emilio Azcarraga Jean assumed presidency of
Grupo Televisa and has been aggressively pursuing a world agenda for the
company. Azcarraga has even stated that he would consider obtaining U.S.
citizenship in order to gain a majority share of Univision.73
TV Azteca is much younger, having been established in 1993. It lacks
the strong relations with the United States that Televisa has maintained
68. Univision, Company Overview, History, http://www.univision.net/corp/en/history
.jsp (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
69. See Geri Smith, Can Televisa Conquer the U.S.?, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 4, 2004, at
70, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_40/b3902088.htm.
70. NBC Universal, Company Overview, http://www.nbcuni.com/AboutNBC_
Universal/CompanyOverview/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
71. See Smith, supra note 69.
72. See Televisa History, http://www.televisa.com/index-eng.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2007).
73. See Smith, supra note 69.
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through its Univision connection. TV Azteca launched its United States
subsidiary, Azteca America, in 2001. Azteca America owns fifty-five
stations in the United States,7 4 including KAZA, the Los Angeles station
that is at the heart of the most recent dispute.
Both Televisa and TV Azteca have maintained a tight seal on the
Mexican television broadcast industry. Mexico's competition laws and
policies have proven to be somewhat ineffective as American networks like
Telemundo have tried to enter the broadcast market.75 Even in other sectors
such as air transport and cellular telephone service, fair competition has
been an elusive condition for the country.
The Federal Competition Commission ("CFC") is the administrative
agency in charge of the monitoring, surveillance, and protection of the
competition process in Mexico.76 The CFC has the authority to control
mergers and sanction a range of anticompetitive behaviors; it has explicit
control over the telecommunications industry. However, until recently, "in
many cases the opinions and recommendations of the CFC are not binding
and can be ignored by the sectoral authority. As a result, the power of the
CFC to remedy anticompetitive outcomes is limited. 77
3. Telemundo v. Mexico: A Storied Battle
It is within this tightly-controlled market with lax competition laws
that Telemundo has repeatedly sought to establish a broadcasting presence.
Beginning in 1994, NBC Universal, through Telemundo, orchestrated a
deal in which Telemundo would own a small share of TV Azteca and
thereby ease its way into the Mexican market. TV Azteca backed out of the
deal before any broadcasts could occur, stating that NBC had not provided
"programming and technical assistance."7
Fast forwarding to 2005, Telemundo finally broke into the Mexican
market and began filming its new show, Quinceahera, in Mexico City,
Mexico. In August 2006, TV Azteca, claiming an exclusive contract with
the show's host, Alan Tacher, obtained an injunction from a Mexican court
to stop production on Quinceahera. A few weeks later, TV Azteca staff,
74. Azteca America, Corporate, http://www.corporate-aztecaamerica.com/coverage/
map.shtml (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
75. See Oliver Solano et al., Challenges to the Effective Implementation of Competition
Policy in Regulated Sectors: The Case of Telecommunications in Mexico, 26 Nw. J. OF INT'L
L. & Bus. 527, 528 (2006).
76. Id. at 530.
77. Id. at 535.
78. Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico's Newest TV Drama is a Bid to Block a Third
Broadcaster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at C3, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gstl
abstract.html?res=F50914FA3D550C758CDDAB0994DE404482.
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lawyers, and Mexico City police broke into the Telemundo studio and
forcefully shut down production of the show.79
After Telemundo moved its production site from Mexico City to
Hialeah, Florida, Mexican television news shows were dominated by
"exposds on how poor people suffer from the high cost of medicines." 80 TV
Azteca and the other Mexican broadcast company, Televisa, consistently
ran television spots targeting pharmaceutical distributor Grupo Casa Saba,
owned by one Isaac Saba Raffoul.81 Mr. Saba, as mentioned above, also
happens to be the Mexican partner of Telemundo. At the same time, TV
Azteca launched news shows describing General Electric, the parent
company of Telemundo, as "a transnational company accused of unfair and
monopolistic practices, fraud and everything you can imagine. 8 2 TV
Azteca and Televisa mounted a two-pronged attack on Telemundo: first,
they forcibly ejected the American broadcaster from Mexican soil, and
second, they attacked the broadcaster's parent company and Mexican
partner through the use of news media.
Both TV Azteca and Televisa claim that the GE and Grupo Casa Saba
coverage is simply a reporting of facts in the interests of the public, not an
indirect attack on an American competitor seeking to enter the Mexican
market.
83
But in the face of the attack on Quinceahera production and the
alleged abuse of Mexican media, Telemundo eventually filed its December
2006 request with the FCC to deny TV Azteca's renewal application for its
Los Angeles broadcast license.84 In effect, Telemundo is arguing for some
amount of reciprocity; if TV Azteca operates to deny Telemundo access to
the Mexican audience, Telemundo wants the FCC to deny TV Azteca
access to the American audience.
4. Reconsidering the FCC's Grant of Azteca America's Los
Angeles License
Azteca America, as a fully-owned United States subsidiary of
Mexico's TV Azteca, satisfies the requirements for foreign ownership
under section 31 0(b)(4), especially as Mexico is a WTO member country
79. TV Azteca Uses Force to Stop Production of Telemundo Reality Show: The
Network Feuds, LATIN HEAT ONLINE (Sep. 28, 2006), http://www.latinheat.corm/news.php?
nid=865&pag--O.
80. Malkin, supra note 78.
81. See GE accuses Mexico's TVfirms of Telemundo plot, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at
C7.
82. Id.
83. Malkin, supra note 78.
84. Id.
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and the FCC would want to foster its goal of international competition. In
fact, the application would have been separately bolstered by a number of
international agreements between Mexico and the United States that affect
both nations' television broadcast industries.
First, as members of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), both Mexico and the United States have a history of
cooperation within the telecommunications industry. 85 NAFTA does not
address the specific issue of licensing, but it is clear from Annex VI of the
agreement that both countries anticipated a level of cooperative reciprocity
in television programming and in the broadcast television industry
generally when they signed the agreement.86 Second, the United States and
Mexico have a number of specific telecommunications agreements that
address the importance of cooperation, especially along the border of the
two countries. The agreements concern radio and television operation in
specific frequencies along the border, specifying uniform requirements for
antennae reception and technical operations. 87 All of these agreements
taken together evince the cooperative relationship that both countries
intended to foster; they lend even more strength to § 310(b)'s built-in
rebuttable presumption that Azteca America is acting in the public interest
and not engaging in anticompetitive behavior.
And yet, TV Azteca, Azteca America's parent, has engaged in
anticompetitive even violent behavior in order to prevent Telemundo, an
American company, from obtaining a Mexican broadcasting license. This
behavior goes against the spirit of the agreements mentioned above and
indeed, the spirit behind the FCC's lenient interpretation of § 310.
Additionally, Mexico simply has not provided any reciprocal hospitality to
American companies.88 But the FCC denied the NBC Universal's
(Telemundo's parent company) petition to deny renewal of the Azteca
America license in Los Angeles 89
The Telemundo situation illustrates the failure of the FCC's current
interpretation of § 310(b) to promote international cooperation in fostering
telecommunications competition. While the FCC issues and renews the
licenses of foreign companies like TV Azteca, countries like Mexico are
not similarly granting American licenses. TV Azteca has taken advantage
85. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605, 767
(1993).
86. Id.
87. See generally Agreement Relating to Assignments and Usage of Television
Broadcasting Channels in the Frequency Range 470-806 MIZ (Channels 14-69) Along the
United States-Mexico Border, U.S.-Mex., June 18, 1982, available at http://www.fcc.gov/
ib/sand/agree/files/mex-bc/uhftvbc.pdf.
88. See Malkin, supra note 78; see also Solano, supra note 75, at 530.
89. See HispanicTips, supra note 7.
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of the American Spanish-speaking audience through the competition-
friendly foreign ownership regulations, while Telemundo is barred from
taking advantage of the Mexican Spanish-speaking audience because of
more protectionist Mexican foreign ownership regulations. The new §
310(b) interpretation does not promote free trade among different nations;
it allows non-American companies to engage in anticompetitive behavior in
order to gain an advantage over American companies in their own market.
The FCC's final determination regarding Azteca America's application for
renewal of their Los Angeles broadcast license is telling. Since the FCC, as
it did in Fox's case, approved the license renewal, it is clear that § 310 (b)'s
policy favoring free trade has grown so large as to overshadow
misrepresentations and anticompetitive behavior that would normally bar
license renewal under the current interpretations of §§ 301 and 307.
V. RECIPROCITY: PART OF A SOLUTION
In the 1997 Notice on Foreign Participation Order, the FCC stated
that some WTO member countries "have made no [competitive access]
commitments, have committed to less than full market access, have not
committed to enforcing fair rules of competition, or might not implement
their commitments fully." 90 Nonetheless, the FCC anticipated that member
countries would fulfill their commitments and, on the basis of that
expectation, implemented a more open policy for foreign owners under §
310(b). The FCC's position at that time was reasonable; in order to truly
effect the United States' promises inherent in the WTO Basic
Telecommunications Agreement, the FCC had to take this leap of faith and
expect that member countries would take similar measures. However, ten
years have since elapsed, and countries like Australia and Mexico have
only just begun to reciprocate the level of openness that the United States
has established. Australia's foreign ownership limits, until very recently,
were substantially lower and less flexible than § 310(b), 9' and many
investors still complain of the barriers to entry into Mexico's
communications industry.92
90. Foreign Participation Order, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 7847,
para. 14 (1997).
91. Jonathan D. Levy, Australian and US Approaches to Media Ownership Regulation
18 (presented to Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Arlington, Virginia,
2004), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2004/343/TPRC2JDL2004.pdf, but
see Kim Jackson, Media Ownership Regulation in Australia, available at http://www.aph.
gov.au/library/intguide/sp/mediaregulations.htm
92. See Geri Smith, A Talk with Mexico's Competition Czar, BusiNEss WEEK, Oct. 6,
2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/oct2006/gb20061006_3
50067.htm.
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Clearly, the United States-through the FCC-must honor its WTO
commitments and give foreign applicants access to our broadcast
audiences, but it certainly does not follow that the FCC must give foreign
applicants a better footing than domestic applicants, especially when these
foreign applicants have violated the licensing requirements set forth in §§
301 and 307.
A. Past Preference for Reciprocity Test Under § 310(b)
This Note's analysis thus far has suggested reciprocity as the best way
to ensure that American broadcast companies will, at the very least, be
afforded an opportunity to enter foreign markets. Unfortunately, the
concept of reciprocity has been reviled since the mid-1990's when the
FCC, Congress, and members of the telecommunications industry began to
debate the issue of WTO commitments and deregulation through §
310(b).93 The policy of reciprocity requires American authorities like the
FCC to relax foreign ownership restrictions on the condition that other
foreign countries do the same for American companies. Although
reciprocity is not currently a part of § 310(b), both Congress and the FCC
have flirted with adding this element throughout the years in various
proposed amendments to § 310(b) and FCC reports and orders.94
Supporters of reciprocity as an element of § 310(b) have long been
active in Congress. This movement began with Senator Larry Pressler, the
Chairman of the Telecommunications Subcommittee of the Senate
Commerce Committee, who first proposed his "Telecommunications
Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995" on January 31, 1995. 9' This
draft bill included the following reciprocity provision as a proposed
amendment to § 310(b), stating that:
[Section 310(b)] shall not apply to any license held, or for which
application is made . . . with respect to any alien (or representative
thereof), corporation, or foreign government (or representative thereof)
if the United States Trade Representative has determined that the
foreign country of which such alien is a citizen, in which such
corporation is organized, or in which such foreign government is in
93. See Trade Implication of Foreign Ownership Restrictions on Telecommunications
Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Hazardous Materials
of the H. Commerce Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Sam Ginn, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, AirTouch Communications).
94. See Erik W. Schmidt, International Telecommunications Transactions: A Critique
of the FCC's "Effective Competitive Opportunities " Analysis, 7 DuKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L
L. 629, 640 (1997).
95. See Sidak, supra note 13, at 240.
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control provides mutually advantageous market opportunities for
broadcast... licenses to citizens of the United States ... 96
The draft bill further proposed a "snapback for reciprocity failure," or a
provision for repercussions if a foreign country refused to provide
reciprocal treatment:
If the United States Trade Representative determines that any foreign
country with respect to which it has made a determination under
paragraph (1) ceases to meet the requirements for that determination,
then-
(A) subsection [310](b) shall apply with respect to such aliens,
corporations, and government . . . on the date on which the Trade
Representative publishes notice of its determination under this
paragraph, and
(B) any license held, or application filed, which could not be held or
granted under subsection [3 10](b) shall be withdrawn, or denied, as the
case may be, by the Commission .... 97
After Senator Pressler and other senators had produced this draft bill,
Senator Ernest Hollings, another ranking member of the Senate Commerce
Committee, circulated a Democratic draft bill that did not contain any
provisions addressing amendment of § 310(b). As a counter, Senator
Pressler introduced a revised version of his Telecommunications
Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995 that reflected certain provisions
highlighted in Senator Hollings' draft bill.98 Notably, the new draft bill
excluded broadcast licenses from the reciprocity.
So in this swift and partisan exchange, the reciprocity test was
eliminated as it applied to broadcast licenses. At the same time, the House
of Representatives formulated a draft bill, the Communications Act of
1995.99 Like the Senate bill, this bill included an amendment proposing a
reciprocity test for § 31 0(b)(4); also like the Senate bill, this reciprocity test
did not apply to television and radio broadcast licenses.'00
Also in 1995, the FCC itself adopted an interpretation of § 310(b) that
was imbued with a reciprocity test. In its 1995 Market Entry and
Regulation Report and Order, 10 the FCC added an Effective Competitive
Opportunities ("ECO") test to § 31 0(b)(4) that examined whether foreign
markets offered effective competitive opportunities to American entities.' 0 2
96. Id. at 240-41 (quoting Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of
1995 (Senate draft, Jan. 31, 1995), § 105, at 39 11. 4-19 (proposed 47 U.S.C. § 310(0)(1))).
97. Id. at 241.
98. Id. at 244.
99. See H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. (1995).
100. Sidak, supra note 13, at 250.
101. Market Entry Report, supra note 23.
102. Id. at para. 2.
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However, this reciprocity test was also abolished with the 1997 Foreign
Participation Order discussed earlier in this Note.
It is clear that reciprocity was a major concern before the FCC
decided to loosen its foreign ownership guidelines. For a period, it seemed
that this leap of faith on the part of the FCC was necessary; in order for
American businesses to pose a credible chance of breaking into foreign
markets, foreign owners had to be given a true opportunity to access the
American market. However, this leap of faith has not paid off, and we have
yet to see other countries afford American broadcast companies any share
of the market; the need for a built-in reciprocity test in § 3 10(b), at least in
respect to broadcast licenses, has surfaced again. Through Fox, Australian
entities have used the liberal free trade policy behind § 310(b) to ensure
renewal of more and more American broadcast licenses. And as evidenced
by the most recent battle between NBC and TV Azteca, Mexican broadcast
companies have taken advantage of the same foreign ownership guideline
while Mexico has refused to open its borders to our broadcasters.
In other areas of the world, wholly United States-owned broadcast
companies like NBC have faced fierce resistance from regulatory bodies in
France and Belgium.103
B. Possible Movement Toward Some Form of Reciprocity Test
In a recent ruling that concerned only small disadvantaged businesses,
the FCC at least has begun to re-acknowledge the importance of
reciprocity.1 4 In discussing the rebuttable presumption that applicants from
WTO member countries enjoy, the FCC stated that this so-called "waiver"
would not be presumed "in cases where it is demonstrated that the home
country of the foreign investor does not, or will not over the ensuing five
years, provide comparable reciprocal treatment to U.S.-based entities or
persons."'0 5 Although this declaratory ruling only applies to a narrow
category of businesses, it is a step in the direction of acknowledging the
problems that American broadcast licensees have faced in foreign markets.
Although the early reciprocity tests formulated by Congress and the
FCC often placed too high a premium on reciprocity, the FCC would not
violate the United States' WTO commitments by requiring at least a
103. Richard Covington, Media Companies Seek Stakes in Networks Abroad: American
TV Invades the World, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 19, 1994, http://www.iht.com/articles/
1994/10/19/media.php.
104. See FCC International Bureau, Adoption of an Declaratory Ruling on Section
310(b)(4) Waivers, Dec. 10, 2004 (Financial Issues Subcommittee Recommendation to the
Federal Communications Commission's Advisory Committee on Diversity for
Communications in the Digital Age), available at http://www.fcc.gov/DiversityFAC/
adopted-recommendations/ForeignOwnershipFinal.doc.
105. Id.
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minimal level of reciprocity from WTO member countries. By requiring
such a baseline, the FCC may reduce the abuse of its own foreign
ownership guidelines and at the same time, ensure that American
broadcasters are able to obtain some licenses in more reluctant countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of § 310(b) of the Communications Act would seem to
indicate that re-implementing some standard of reciprocity would be a step
backwards toward the dark ages of protectionism and unfounded national
security concerns. The new interpretation of § 310(b) was heralded as a
definitive statement of the United States' commitment to the cooperative
trade goals of the WTO's Basic Telecommunications Agreement.
However, the interpretation has played out disappointingly; instead of
propelling other countries to open up their borders to American
telecommunications investment, the FCC has given foreign companies
impermissible advantages over American companies while American
companies struggle to survive in broadcast licensing industries outside of
the United States. By adopting some measure of reciprocity, the FCC can
enable American companies to at least break into markets like Mexico.
The increasing importance of foreign television audiences and free
trade policies led the FCC to deregulate its foreign ownership restrictions in
1995; this was the first phase in the increasingly global nature of
communications policy. But now, the world is entering a second phase in
which many other countries are joining the race to win television audiences
everywhere; Congress and the FCC must look at this second phase and
formulate a new interpretation of § 310(b) that will continue to promote
free trade while ensuring fair competition among all the players.
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